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Abstract 
We demonstrate that users may be prone to place an inordi-
nate amount of trust in black box algorithms that are framed 
as intelligent. We deploy an algorithm that purportedly as-
sesses the positivity and negativity of a users’ writing emo-
tional writing. In actuality, the algorithm responds in a ran-
dom fashion. We qualitatively examine the paths to trust 
that users followed while testing the system. In light of the 
ease with which users may trust systems exhibiting “intelli-
gent behavior” we recommend corrective approaches. 
 Introduction   
Hidden algorithms increasingly govern our lives. Hundreds 
of decisions pertaining to each of us are made each day. 
Google Now decides your route to work, Facebook choos-
es your most interesting friends for the day, and Netflix 
spins up your closely monitored “Understated Independent 
Dysfunctional-Family Dramas” recommendation category. 
These decisions made on our behalf directly influence our 
behavior, but researchers have only recently begun to ex-
amine the human aspects of these interactions.   
 We believe that complex algorithmic behavior should be 
explained to users. Prior research indicates that short textu-
al explanations of algorithmic decision-making build trust 
with the algorithm’s results (Kizilcec, 2016). However, 
explanation need not happen only in text. EmotiCal (Hollis 
et al., 2016) is a mobile mood regulation application that 
predicts users’ future moods based upon previous activities 
and trends. The EmotiCal interface encourages users to 
actively explore how future mood predictions change 
based on new activities that they schedule. For example, 
they can see that adding an activity like “see a movie with 
a friend” boosts future mood, whereas “working alone” 
does not. This form of experiential explanation allows us-
ers to experiment with the system and draw obvious cause 
and effect inferences from their experimentation.  
 Other recent research suggests a rather different view-
point. KnowMe (Warshaw et al., 2015) is a program that 
infers personality traits from a user’s posts on social media 
based on Big Five personality theory. Users were simply 
                                               
 
told that the program analyzes their word use and corre-
lates this with established personality surveys. We asked 
participants to evaluate KnowMe’s outputs, in the form of 
a short paragraph describing their personality. Users were 
quick to defer to algorithmic judgment about their own 
personalities, stating that the algorithm is likely to have 
greater credibility than their own personal statements (e.g., 
“...At the end of the day, that’s who the system says I 
am...”). This is particularly interesting because users ought 
to consider themselves to be true experts on their own per-
sonality. KnowMe users were also given the ability to cor-
rect the algorithm’s judgment of their personality. Even 
when users disagreed with KnowMe’s output, or when 
they felt that a negative portrayal was being presented, they 
still showed hesitancy to correct it. These findings indicate 
broad over-acceptance of algorithmic authority in the 
realm of personality judgments even when the algorithm 
fails to offer an explanation of the judgment. There are 
echoes here with research on persuasion where participants 
may overlook the content of an argument instead relying 
on the authority of the persuading agent (Petty et al., 
1981). 
Figure 1: The E-meter System 
 We examine a new domain in the context of these recent 
paradoxical findings: mood. People often have difficulty 
interpreting their own emotions and predicting future mood 
states (Gilbert et al., 1998). In order to prompt individuals 
to more carefully consider their own moods and the rea-
sons for these feelings, applications like Echo (Isaacs et al., 
2013, Konrad et al., 2016a,b) have employed Technology 
Mediated Reflection (TMR). Echo asks users to reflect on 
previous memories and their relation to their mood, which 
in turn causes positive adaptions and higher wellbeing.  
 We propose that algorithmic evaluation of people’s writ-
ing can be used to facilitate TMR. Using data from previ-
ous studies like EmotiCal and Echo, we have built highly 
accurate models that predict user mood from the journal 
entries they write. Would displaying feedback from this 
algorithm in real-time cause people to carefully consider 
their writing and reflect on how the events they write about 
affected them?  
 Asking this question led us to consider the relationship 
between algorithm accuracy and user response to the algo-
rithm’s presentation and context. In order to draw a base-
line and disaggregate these factors we removed algorithm 
accuracy from the equation. Rather than having users re-
spond to a carefully constructed model of mood, we asked 
them to respond to random responses framed as intelli-
gence. Participants were presented with a webpage, and 
asked to write about their personal experiences over the 
last 3 days. They were told that an intelligent algorithm, 
the E-meter, was monitoring their writing and interpreting 
their feelings. The random feedback was presented in a 
“mood meter”. We then asked them a series of questions 
about algorithmic accuracy, plausibility, and acceptability. 
Methods 
E-meter System 
The E-meter system (Figure 1) presented participants with 
a webpage that contained a short set of instructions, a text 
box, and a gauge that changed in real time as they wrote. 
Underneath the graphic was a short explanation: “The 
graphic above displays the output from an algorithm that 
assesses the positivity/negativity of your writing as you 
answer the question below.” The user was prompted to 
pick 3 events that had emotionally affected them in the past 
3 days and then write a paragraph about how and why each 
event had affected them.  
 As the participants answered the prompt, the E-meter 
reacted by fluctuating in sync with the participant’s writ-
ing. Given that our primary interest was user’s responses to 
the system we programmed the E-meter trend either posi-
tive or negative rather than actually evaluate the user’s 
writing. We expected that this would produce expectation 
violation for some users, which previous research has indi-
cated plays a major role in responses to algorithmic inter-
faces (Kizilcec, 2016). The E-meter responded randomly 
with a positive or negative bias to each word over 4 char-
acters. This gave the illusion that the algorithm ignored 
many uninformative words such as “is”, “the”, and “of”. 
The positive and negative bias was small so that the E-
meter graphic would often show small trends in either di-
rection but overall the trend would slowly grow positive or 
negative. We hypothesized that this set of behaviors would 
lead to believable system where users could not easily tell 
that the algorithm was not actually “assess[ing] the positiv-
ity/negativity of your writing”. 
Participants 
Participants were recruited in 2 separate stages. Four par-
ticipants were recruited initially from the authors’ connec-
tions. These participants were primarily used to fix the 
initial system presentation, wording, and instructions. Be-
tween each of the 4 participants the system was modified 
to better address the concerns and flaws that were exposed 
by the previous participant.  
 The second stage consisted of 8 participants recruited 
from the /r/SampleSize community on Reddit. While de-
mographic information was not gathered, it is likely that 
these participants mirrored the Reddit population as a 
whole. Reddit users tend to be younger, male biased, and 
more technologically savvy than the general population 
(Barthel et al., 2016). These users were asked to carry out 
the procedure on a volunteer basis. 
Materials and Methodology 
After users wrote about 3 emotionally charged events, we 
asked a number of questions. These primarily focused on 
users’ judgments of the accuracy of the E-meter and its 
affects on their writing. 
 The responses were first coded using an open coding 
method; this created 13 initial codes. Thematic coding was 
then used to group the open codes into 7 major themes. We 
focus primarily on 2 of these themes: user testing of the 
algorithm and user internal states compared to user repre-
sented state. 
Results 
While a sample of 12 participants is far too small to draw 
an accurate quantitative representation of the population, 
we report accuracy to satisfy curiosity. Although we are 
aware of the limited nature of our data, we also present a 
qualitative analysis of responses, suggesting behaviors and 
attitudes that give rise to important design considerations. 
Users rated the E-meter accuracy on a 7-point scale with 
possible responses ranging from 1 (very inaccurate) to 7 
(very accurate). The median report for users’ assessment of 
the E-meter’s accuracy was 5 (see Figure 2), which indi-
cates that the E-meter was “Slightly Accurate”.  
  Many users tested the algorithm as they were writing. 
Some did so by consciously manipulating the application 
and watching the changes in the E-meter according to each 
word they wrote:  
“I used 'father' and it went up, obviously thinking 
family = nice.  I used 'trust' and it went up, obviously 
thinking trust = good.” – Participant 9 
 
 Others explicitly changed their writing in order to see 
how the E-meter responded: 
“Its lack of sensitivity to my adding a couple more 
"positive" words at the end of my third paragraph af-
ter the rest of my writing had been strongly negative 
was also somewhat impressive.” - Participant 3  
“I was messing with it to see if more positive words 
would give a more positive rating.” – Participant 11 
 
 Even though many users explicitly tested the random E-
meter, they still found it slightly accurate. We attribute this 
to a combination of confirmation bias and peripheral routes 
to persuasion (Petty et al., 1981). Even Participant 9, who 
demonstrated to their own satisfaction that the E-meter was 
wrong, explicitly talks about how their expectations of the 
algorithm’s performance were confirmed. Perhaps more 
perniciously, participants were highly likely to disregard 
opposing evidence, like the E-meter going down when they 
wrote something happy, due to the framing of the system 
as AI-like. In other writing we see that many users make 
explicit excuses for why the E-meter’s output did not 
match their mood exactly. Participant 5 wrote: 
“I did not give it enough to work with” 
The clearest evidence of confirmation bias is revealed in 
how Participant 10 wrote: 
“It was somewhat inaccurate as one of my days items 
was negative. My other 2 were very positive so - yeah 
- it was rather accurate.” 
 
We also saw some evidence for algorithmic omniscience. 
Three participants wrote in ways that suggested that they 
believed something deeper might be happening with the 
algorithm, almost as if it could see through the text into 
how they were really feeling. They felt that the way they 
represented themselves in their writing was not always an 
accurate mirror of how they truly felt. In one example, Par-
ticipant 4 rated their writing’s mood a 3 and the E-meter 
“assessed” the writing’s mood as a 1. Participant 4 then 
wrote (emphasis ours): 
“While this week was mostly an emotionally chal-
lenging one for me, I mostly listed minor issues 
through the week as well as some positive ones.  
Strictly from the writing, it should have probably 
read closer to a neutral or only slightly negative 
state.” 
 
In another similar example Participant 8 rated the accuracy 
of the E-meter as “Accurate” and then wrote (emphasis 
ours): 
“I'm not in a great mood, but it was all the way bad 
and One of my three memories was plesant [sic]” 
 
These, among others, illustrate that participants engaged in 
the exercise with two different perspectives on how they 
were representing themselves. They write about an internal 
self (“I’m not in a great mood”) and also a represented self 
(“Strictly from the writing”). The example data presented 
here suggests that they viewed the algorithm as almost 
omniscient, seeing through their represented selves into 
their internal selves. This has potentially troubling conse-
quences for people’s knowledge of algorithms as well as 
for how we present their results. 
Discussion 
We are aware that we have conducted a small pilot. Never-
theless, combined with consistent results from other recent 
studies (Warshaw et al., 2015, Costa et al., 2016), im-
portant issues arise concerning algorithm perception and 
authority. Nearly twice as many users rated our completely 
random system as accurate rather than inaccurate. This is 
especially critical given the context in which the algorithm 
is operating. As in the Warshaw et al. (2015) personality 
study, the participants themselves are the true experts of 
their own mood. Nevertheless, participants are willing to 
consider that an algorithm can know their mood as well or 
better than themselves. This demonstrates the trust and 
authority that we imbue algorithms with in our daily lives.  
 The first route through which participants gained trust in 
the system was through their own active testing of the E-
Figure 2: E-meter User Accuracy Ratings 
meter. Users typed words that they associated with positive 
or negative moods and saw how the meter responded, often 
concluding that it was accurate. From an objective stand-
point this seems absurd. The E-meter is literally respond-
ing randomly to words over 4 characters and a short exper-
iment should be enough to dispel the AI myth.  
 However, this underestimates the biases that we all hold. 
We are programmed to look for patterns in randomness 
(Foster and Kokko, 2009). Combine this predilection for 
pattern seeking with peripheral persuasive routes and con-
sidering a random algorithm framed as AI to be accurate 
begins to make sense. Users are essentially seeking to con-
firm what they have already been told rather than evaluat-
ing the system on its merits. Without explanation, users are 
forced to rely on peripheral routes including the perceived 
prestige and trustworthiness of the company deploying the 
algorithms (Petty et al., 1981). 
 The second major route for participants to trust the E-
meter was through a belief in the omnipotence of the algo-
rithm. This directly echoes results of the KnowMe system 
where users felt that its accuracy was “eerie” given the 
small amount of information it used (Warshaw et al., 
2015). What is particularly troubling for the E-meter is that 
this happened with random output. This suggests that some 
users may be overly deferential to an algorithm’s evalua-
tion, even for areas in which they have expertise. 
 Both of these routes result in users placing far too much 
trust in algorithmic decisions. The consequences of this 
may already be realized in the use of the Tesla Autopilot 
system. Users have ignored recommendations and the ex-
plicit warnings from the system to keep hands on the steer-
ing wheel at all times and to be ready for a manual takeo-
ver and this has resulted in 2 confirmed crashes, including 
one fatality (Tesla, 2016; Isidore and Sung, 2016). 
 In addition, more research is needed to address the po-
tential psychological consequences of trusting algorithm 
feedback. For example, recent findings have suggested that 
false feedback on stress states can impact the perceived 
stress of a difficult task (Costa et al., 2016). Rather than 
only changing thoughts, incorrect inferences can funda-
mentally influence emotional states and behavior. We find 
this troubling given the 165,000 health related applications 
available from Google Play and iTunes. Our results sug-
gest that users may be over willing to credit these applica-
tions, with possible negative consequences for their health. 
 Our results suggest that great care must be taken in de-
signing applications that “explain” algorithms. Users’ cri-
teria for explanation may be much less stringent that we 
have previously thought. We recommend further research 
into experiential explanation and how to use this to cali-
brate expectations. 
 As initial steps we call for best practices for explanation. 
Best practices for explanation entails first following the 
example set in (Kizilcec 2016) of short explanations and 
then, one step further, providing access to resources that 
explain the functioning in more detail.  
 Long term we believe that learning algorithms making 
impactful decisions must be audited by a regulatory third 
party. We envision this regulator filling a similar role as 
the Weights and Measures Division in the USA. This 
would make sure the veneer of intelligence is not simply 
snake oil underneath. 
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